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“Should I give up or should I just keeping chasing pavements
Even it leads nowhere?
Or would it be a waste even if I knew my place
Should I leave it there?”
Adele 19
© Universal Music Publishing Ltd 2008
Abstract
Revolving around the concept of  “Community”, or “community” – the use of the capital “c”  
being seen as indicative of cultural homogeneity - debate on an Asian region has ostensibly 
pitted those who favour an entity limited to East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and the ten 
countries of ASEAN) against those who propose a much wider entity embracing India, North 
(and,  perhaps,  South)  America,  as  well  as  Australasia.  Previously  these  two 
conceptualizations  possessed  their  eponymous  translation  in  the  East  Asian  Economic 
Caucus (reincarnated as ASEAN +3) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum respectively. However with the creation in 2005 of the East Asian Summit (EAS) to 
include India, Australia and New Zealand and, above all, its 2011 enlargement to include the 
United States and Russia, the distinction between the two conceptualizations of an Asian 
region has become confused. In order to explain this development, this paper suggests that 
the language of “region” or “community” is a discursive smokescreen disguising changes in 
approaches to multilateralism. An examination of the EAS, contrasted with another recent 
regional project, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), suggests that the actors involved, both 
state and non-state, are seeking overwhelmingly to ensure the primacy of individual nation-
states in intergovernmental multilateral relations. 
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“Chasing Pavements”: The East Asia Summit and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Discursive Regionalism as 
Disguised Multilateralism
Introduction
Defining Asia is not at all self-evident. As argued elsewhere, in the period beginning with the 
high  age  of  Western  imperialism  and  the  related  rise  of  movements  for  national 
independence  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  a  larger  Sino-Indic 
conceptualization of “Asia” was prevalent amongst Asians themselves (Camroux 2007). This 
notion of Asia reached its apex at the Afro-Asian summit at Bandung in 1955, an event, as 
Acharya  (2009)  has  argued,  that  determined  many  of  the  norms  of  regionalism  and 
multilateral  behaviour  in  Asia.   However,  with  India’s  withdrawal  inwards,  following 
independence and within the context of the Cold War this notion fell into abeyance until the 
1990s  and  the  ‘Look  East’  policy  of  the  then  Indian  Finance  Minister,  and  later  Prime 
Minister, Manmohan Singh. At that point India seemed, at least rhetorically, to have entered 
into  the  Asian  developmental  state  schema  that  in  various  nuances  is  a  common 
characteristic of political trajectories within developing Asia (Devare 2006).
If defining Asia has had its pitfalls, describing Asian regional integration has also posed a 
challenge for scholars. Is this like the lyrics in the British pop singer Adele’s soulful 2008 hit  
cited above about “chasing pavements’, that is confusing the static platform with the object of 
pursuit?  Such confusion especially occurs in trying to differentiate Asian forms of regional 
integration  from  forms  elsewhere,  especially  in  relation  to  the  European  Union,  which 
remains, for better or worse, a reference point in terms of institutionalised regional integration 
(Breslin & Higgott 2000). Neo-realists (Jones & Smith 2009) and scholars in the IPE school 
(Ravenhill  2009)  have  raised  serious  reservations  concerning  Asian  regional  integration, 
suggesting that  process overwhelms substance.  In this context  it  is  not  surprising that  a 
plethora of adjectives have emerged to qualify Asian regionalism starting with the term “open 
regionalism”  associated  both  with  APEC  (Ravenhill  2001)  and  also  with  the  Japanese 
approach  (Terada  1998,  2003)  and  moving  more  recently  to  concepts  of  “monetary 
regionalism” (Dieter & Higgott 2003), “regulatory regionalism” (Jayasuriya 2009), “networked 
regionalism”  (Jetschke  2009,  Yeo  2010),  “mandalic  regionalism”   (Dellios  2008)  and 
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“strategic regionalism” (Gilson 2010). Defining its limits has led to formulating expressions 
such  as  “frustrated  regionalism”  (Nair  2009),  “reactive  regionalism”  (Searight  2011)  and 
“reactionary regionalism” (Beeson 2003). If a phenomenon requires so many qualifications to 
define it then does this not raise serious doubts about its existence, let alone substance? 
Moreover, suppose in our search for regional integration in Asia we have been searching for 
the wrong political animal? 
This paper is concerned with examining trajectories of regional integration. However, such 
processes  may  involve  not  only  forms  of  intra-regional  cooperation  and  ostensible 
community-building, but also forms of bilateralism and, above all, multilateralism. Yet, what if 
the processes involved were only limited to the latter? In other words, were “region” and 
“regionalism”  merely  misleading  labels  to  indicate  multilateral  behaviour  within  a 
geographically defined area sometimes described as “minilateralism”? This article aims at 
answering these questions by providing an analysis of the East Asian Summit and providing 
a comparison with another  regional  project,  the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership.  The choice of 
these two case studies for comparison is prompted by two factors. On the one hand, and 
most  importantly,  they  are  ostensibly  examples  of,  respectively,  East  Asian  regional 
integration and trans-Pacific regional integration referred to above. On the other hand, they 
are both recent creations, whose membership contours are in a state of flux an analysis of 
which  provides  the  occasion  to  contribute  to  the  burgeoning  literature  in  the  field  of 
comparative regionalism.
The  paper  is  structured  in  the  following  way.  It  begins  with  an  overview  of  theories  of 
mulitilateralism,  particularly  those  elaborated  within  the  FP 7  MERCURY project  on  the 
European Union and multilateralism within whose intellectual agenda this paper has been 
prepared. In the second section, the origins of the East Asian Summit are examined prior to 
turning, in the third section, to its enlargement in 2011 to include Russia and the United 
States. An overview of the Trans-Pacific Partnership provided in the fourth section suggests 
that  similar  factors  are  at  play  in  both  cases  of  Asian  regional  integration.  The  paper 
concludes by resituating the language of “region” in contemporary Asia.
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Multilateralism Clothed in Regionalism
As John  Ruggie,  the  pre-eminent  scholar  of  the  concept,  admitted  “multilateralism”  is  a 
difficult notion to pin down.  He defined it himself as meaning “coordinating relations among 
three  or  more  states…  Multilateralism  represented  a  ‘generic  institutional  form’ and 
implied institutional arrangements” (Ruggie 1993: 8-10; emphasis in the original). He saw 
multilateralism  as  relying  on  generalised  principles  of  conduct,  indivisibility  and  diffuse 
reciprocity. With time and the rapid evolution of the global system over the last two decades, 
such a definition has been found wanting, on the one hand, for failing to take into account the 
role  of  non-state  actors and,  on the other,  for  being preconditioned on the existence of 
institutions.  Thus,  this  article  takes  as  its  definition  a  broader  and  institutionally  neutral 
definition proposed by Caroline Bouchard and John Peterson, following from their critique of 
Ruggie on the above lines. They posit contemporary multilateralism, as “three or more actors 
engaging in voluntary (and essentially) institutionalised international cooperation governed 
by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to all states” (Bouchard 
& Peterson 2011: 10).  
Taking into account this wider and more satisfactory definition of multilateralism and returning 
to  the  original  formulation  by  John  Ruggie  does  provide  insights  into  an  analysis  of 
phenomena  of  regional  integration.  In  particular  his  insistence  on  the  importance  of 
architectural  design (Ruggie  1993:  12)  is  of  direct  relevance.  Indeed the trope “regional 
architecture” is a constant theme for political actors in Asia and the Asia-Pacific in terms of 
referring to the multilateral structures they are seeking, rhetorically at least, to put in place. 
Ruggie’s (1993: 18) reference to the early nineteenth century “Concert of Europe” as a first 
example of such a framework is of particular salience. For example, the former Australian 
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd’s, promotion of what was depicted as an equivalent 21st Century 
“Concert of Asia” led to a hostile reaction from his Asian peers.2 Moreover, qualifiers such as 
“nominal” and “qualitative”, or “formal” and “substantive”, applied to multilateralism have their 
echoes in discussions of regional integration. James Caporaso’s further refinement of the 
concept  of  multilateralism  also  provides  useful  insights  to  stimulate  our  thinking  on 
“regionalism”.  He  argues  that  much  of  ostensible  “multilateralism”  is  in  fact  forms  of 
“aggregate bilateralism” (Caporaso 1993: 61), a description that is particularly appropriate for 
2      This was indeed the impression this author gleaned during informal conversation with Southeast 
Asian participants when attending the conference - organized by the Australian Foreign and Trade 
Ministry in Sydney from 3rd to 4th December 2009 - in order to promote the idea of an Asia-Pacific 
community. The Singaporean participants were particularly incensed that such a Concert would 
exclude the smaller countries and would draw Indonesia out of ASEAN.
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the three quarters of FTAs that exist  in the Asia-Pacific today, which are purely bilateral,  
despite some claims to their regional purview.  Caporaso (1992: 77), furthermore, indicates 
that  multilateralism  involves  “shared  language  and  norms”,  the  very  aspects  that 
constructivist  scholars such as Amitav Acharya (2004, 2009) see as lying at the heart  of 
Asian regional integration.
Finally, part of the difficulty in using “multilateralism” as a concept is that it is an “ism”, a 
doctrine that has evolved over time (Lazarou et al. 2010). Whether it is viewed positively or 
negatively  depends on one’s  standpoint.  Hence,  for  example,  the preference of  Chinese 
policy-makers for a “sovereignty based multilateralism” (Wu 2009: 68) that, while recognising 
economic interdependence and a concomitant acceptance of some degree of multilateral 
oversight of such issues, regards questions of, say, human rights as purely domestic matters. 
The  language  of  regionalism would  appear  to  offer  a  solution  to  resolving  some of  the 
domestic-global tensions, for it  can be seen as an acceptable face/form of multilateralism 
legitimized by reference to accepted, and much vaunted, aspects of economic and socio-
cultural  (but  not  political)  integration.  Political  actors  in  East  Asia  may  not  be  ready  to 
proclaim themselves as “Citizens of the World”, but they will glory in their membership of a  
(dynamic) Asian world. The two case studies developed below have been chosen with this in 
mind. Both the terminology chosen, and the discourse surrounding, respectively, the East 
Asian  Summit  and  the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership,  would  suggest  an  adherence  to 
“regionalism as a doctrine”, in a way often attributed to “multilateralism” as doctrine.  Yet, as 
suggested below, “regionalism as doctrine”, involving a confusion of the object pursued with 
the platform of the pursuit, also poses its own difficulties. Are indeed the actors involved 
merely chasing pavements? 
The East Asian Summit, the First Phase
The  East  Asian  Summit  (EAS),  with  a  rhetorical  spin  is  generally  conceptualized  as  a 
putative East Asian Community with a capital “c”, or at least a community with a lower case 
“c”.  Yet  the empirical  evidence shows it  is  indeed just  a  summit  or  even,  as expressed 
prosaically  by  an  eminent  American  scholar,  “a  dinner  followed  by  sixteen  speeches” 
(Emmerson 2010: 2).  The summit is an annual half-day meeting tacked onto the annual 
ASEAN Summit,  the  ASEAN+3 Meeting  plus  a  series  of  bilateral  summits  with  ASEAN 
countries involving China, Japan and—rather significantly since 2009— the United States. At 
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the conclusion of the Summit a largely pre-prepared chairman’s statement is read out. Unlike 
ASEAN  summits,  which  are  the  culmination  of  literally  hundreds  of  meetings  between 
ASEAN policymakers supported by a permanent secretariat in Jakarta, the East Asia Summit 
is a one-off event in which the photo-op is the message. While there are the usual meetings 
of “sherpas” (senior officials) before the event, there is no permanent secretariat  or even 
permanent institutional arrangements, the ASEAN Secretariat acting merely as a clearing-
house. These initial remarks are not meant to diminish the symbolism of such a meeting. On 
the contrary,  in  justifying  the Obama Administration’s  self-proclaimed reengagement  with 
Asia (Choi 2009), US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stealing a line from Woody Allen, 
declared that “half of diplomacy is getting there” (Clinton 2010). 
Back in 2005 there was no question of an American representative being asked to turn up. 
“One  Vision,  One  Identity,  One  Community”:  the  banners  adorning  the  streets  of  Kuala 
Lumpur in December 2005 revealed the grandiose ambitions of the Malaysian hosts for the 
first  East  Asia  Summit.  They also  revealed  many  ambiguities  in  defining  Asian  regional 
integration. The key question in the context of the EAS was whether the intergovernmental 
meeting being promoted was that  of  the ten ASEAN governments or  that  extended into 
ASEAN +3, i.e. including China, Japan and South Korea. These issues were highlighted - 
and not entirely resolved - in the inaugural meeting held on 14th December of an East Asia 
Summit,  an "ASEAN +3 +1 +2" with the invitation extended to  India,  Australia  and New 
Zealand, as had been envisaged for several years (East Asian Vision Group 2001, East 
Asian  Study  Group  2002).  Behind  the  tedious  international  relations  algebra  lay  three 
questions of importance: Southeast Asia’s cohesiveness and centrality in the construction of 
a putative (East) Asian Community, coping with an increasingly economically powerful and 
diplomatically assertive China, and the “return” of India to Asia.  
The first two days of the ASEAN summit in 2005 saw the Association, having fully recovered 
from  the  economic  crisis  of  1997,  return  to  being  concerned  with  its  own  internal 
consolidation. By expressing demands for tangible political reforms in Burma/Myanmar the 
Association  broke  with  its  sacrosanct  principle  of  non-interference.  Moreover,  the 
appointment of an Eminent Persons Group to draft an ASEAN Charter demonstrated that the 
Association had finally come to grips with establishing rules for club membership. Perhaps 
the  greatest  success  for  the  summit  chair,  the  then  Malaysian  Prime Minister,  Abdullah 
Badawi, was to ensure ASEAN’s centrality in the process of regional construction, at least 
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rhetorically.  To use the shorthand language of  the summit,  ASEAN would  remain  in  the 
“driver’s seat”, and future annual East Asian Summits would be held in ASEAN countries 
“back-to-back” with the Association’s annual meetings. Given Sino-Japanese rivalry, and the 
unwillingness of the governments of either country to accept the leadership of the other, by 
default, ASEAN remained the least unacceptable alternative as regional coordinator, a view 
ostensibly also held by the new invitees, India, Australia and New Zealand. In the diplomatic 
formula  decided  upon  in  the  Summit,  a  compromise  was  reached  with  the  East  Asian 
Community being defined in terms of ASEAN +3, with the three new partners invited to the 
East Asian Summit seen as sharing common interests while, not necessarily, being part of 
the “community”. However, at the same time, in the jargon of “inclusiveness” and “openness” 
it  was  agreed  an  Asian  Community  could  extend  to  embrace  them as  well  as  Russia. 
Regions, as Katzenstein (2005) has suggested, are porous entities indeed.
Nevertheless,  concerns  over  China  remained  and  engendered  competing  strategies  (Yu 
2008). The summit demonstrated divisions within ASEAN as a regional organization, with the 
Singaporean,  Thai  and Indonesian support  for  enlargement from the ASEAN +3 formula 
being at odds with the more exclusive membership proposed by Malaysia, Cambodia and 
Vietnam. These cleavages, reiterated in think tank and other meetings immediately before 
the summit (Matsubara 2006), reflected not only geopolitical considerations, but also internal 
political  factors: some non-state actors, essentially those involved in  advocacy NGOs, in 
ASEAN  countries  were  more  favourable  to  a  broader  Asia  including  the  three  new 
democratic  invitees.  Moreover,  different  Asian  actors  had,  and  continue  to  have,  rather 
different  expectations for  an Asian community.  For  example,  documents emanating from 
major pro-governmental think tanks in Korea and Singapore advocated a putative East Asian 
Community,  essentially  as  an  exercise  in  confidence-building  concerned  primarily  with 
security questions (Kwon & Hong 2005, Malik 2006, See & Emmers 2005).
Developments in the year following the Kuala Lumpur summit and in the second summit just 
over a year later underlined the tensions already present there. The Annual Meeting of the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) held in Hyderabad in early May 2006 was revealing in this 
regard. For the first time a multilateral body was called upon by some participants, including 
the Chinese representative Jin Renqing, to encourage Asian regional integration through, for 
example, developing local bond markets, and to “help Asia find its voice”. Manmohan Singh, 
in  particular,  sought ADB aid in creating a pan-Asian free trade agreement (FTA) (Singh 
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2006).  In developing an Asian Currency Unit, based on a basket of hard and soft East Asian 
currencies,  the  ADB  is  building  on  the  monetary  regionalisation  that  involves  swap 
agreements and cooperation between Asian central banks (Dieter and Higgott 2003). The 
negotiation of an India-ASEAN FTA, similar to that between China and ASEAN which came 
into force in January 2010, would seem to be an element in a larger pan-Asian FTA, but it is 
juxtaposed with the bilateral FTAs signed with individual ASEAN countries such as Singapore 
and Thailand.  While  the  Chinese negotiated for  an ASEAN-China FTA by offering  “early 
harvest” advantages to all of their partners, the Japanese, through the Ministry of Economy 
Trade and Industry, remained favourable to cooperation among the thirteen participants in 
Kuala  Lumpur,  taken  individually.  In  practice  this  involved  concentrating  on  bilateral 
agreements, for example with the Philippines, and down-playing ASEAN as an interlocutor.
By the time of the second summit there had been two contingent developments. The first, it 
would appear, was an acknowledgement by the Chinese leadership that it  would need to 
accept the virtual enlargement of an “Asian community” to include India (as well as Australia 
and New Zealand) and, therefore, to complete the negotiations for an East Asian inner circle 
(i.e. ASEAN +3).  Within it, China would be the main player through the signing of a China-
ASEAN FTA in order to limit the impact of such an enlargement (Huang 2005). 
The  second  was to  relegate  this  intra-regional  level  compact  to  being  subordinate  to  a 
number of bilateral initiatives, for example, in securing energy supplies in Africa or Australia 
and in reinforcing relations in Central Asia. At the same time, on the multilateral level, the 
Chinese leadership, albeit with a great deal of reluctance, demonstrated a willingness slightly 
to readjust the value of the renminbi and thus to contribute to a readjustment of global trade 
balances.3 The second summit held in the Filipino city of Cebu was postponed from the 
original December 2006 dates to mid-January 2007, ostensibly because of the weather, but 
also  –  or  perhaps  because  of  –  concerns  with  terrorist  threats.  The  Cebu  summit  was 
dominated by a further step towards the promulgation of an ASEAN Charter and specific 
bilateral initiatives with both China and India. Yet in its very low-key banality, Cebu and the 
following summits confirmed that the Sino-Indic conceptualisation of an Asian community of 
Bandung had re-established itself as another acceptable imagining of a twenty-first century 
Asia. However this summit and the following three confirmed that the creation of the East 
3    This, however, was not an act of political altruism. As, on average, almost two thirds of the cost of 
a product made in China is composed of imported components, etc. usually denominated in dollars, a 
putative devaluation would have meant an increase in the costs of these elements therefore leading to 
less competitive prices for Chinese goods in relation to Asian competitors.
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Asian Summit was a superficial addition to Asia’s complex regional architecture. In the words 
of the late Hadi Soesastro, “the creation of new clubs did not necessarily mean progress” 
(Soesatro  2006:  53).  Moreover  its  creation  had  not  diminished  the  search  for  bilateral 
solutions, especially the pursuit of bilateral Free Trade Agreements.  On the contrary, the five 
years following the first summit saw an acceleration of this process in the Asia Pacific, a 
development discussed below. 
EAS Enlargement: Widening Trumps Deepening
During the five years following the first two summits, differing conceptualizations of an Asian 
region  continued  to  compete.  With  the  ratification  of  the  ASEAN  Charter  in  2009,  the 
Association  not  only  made  a  further  step  toward  institutionalisation  but  also  became  a 
recognized legal entity in international law. The ASEAN Secretariat found representation both 
as  an  invitee  to  the  G20 and  within  the  Asia-Europe  Meeting  (ASEM).  The  latter  itself 
experienced two enlargements, firstly with India and Mongolia in 2008 and then in 2010 with 
the participation of Australia, New Zealand and Russia at their first summit held in Brussels. 
These enlargements further challenged a purely East Asian conceptualization of the Asian 
region while raising questions about the efficacy of a body now comprising some forty-seven 
members (Lenihan 2011). Be that as it may, ASEM enlargement demonstrated, for those who 
desired such an outcome, that widening could effectively undermine deepening.
For  the  EAS the proposal  to  extend  membership  to  the  United  States  and  Russia  first 
presented at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting of July in Hanoi and then confirmed at 
the ASEAN Summit  and East Asia Summit of  December 2010 is  a crucial  development, 
despite receiving little media attention. When this becomes effective in 2011, any pretence 
that membership is exclusively East Asian will disappear. Given previous Chinese hostility to 
such an enlargement, US reticence to engage regionally, and Japan’s notorious difficulties 
when it comes to exercising regional leadership, this development represents a watershed in 
Asia-Pacific  relations  and  is  worthy  of  explanation.  Paradoxically,  enlargement  occurred 
against the background of the ousting of the two political leaders in Asia and the Pacific who 
had been most vocal in articulating a vision of an Asian community in the first two years of 
their shortened terms: Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, and his Japanese counterpart, 
Hatoyama Yukio. While Rudd had agitated for an Asia-Pacific community involving the United 
States, Hatoyama had been ambiguous and ambivalent  about  potential  US membership, 
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reflecting  disagreements  amongst  Japanese  political  leaders  and  their  ministries  on  the 
subject (Terada 2010).
The  key  to  understanding  this  evolution  is  an  intra-regional  convergence, albeit  a 
convergence that may simply be an acquiescence in developments beyond the control of 
any one major  global actor.  As a number  of  authors have argued,  the  evidence would 
suggest an increasing Chinese preference for engagement in multilateralism due, in part, to 
domestic pressures (Wu 2008; Wu 2009; Yoshimatsu 2009; Pearson 2010). An examination 
of the evidence would suggest that there has been a convergence between Chinese, US and 
Japanese views about  the appropriate regional  architecture (to  use the jargon of policy-
makers). Furthermore ASEAN, possibly because of its own internal divisions, has welcomed 
such a widening of membership as long as the symbol of its “being in the driver’s seat” is  
maintained.  In the following we deal in  order with contemporary Chinese, Japanese and 
American approaches to the Summit.
Chinese Hedging
Writing on China's rise and the marshalling of its soft power for this purpose has become a 
growth industry. It is not our purpose to assess this vast literature, but rather to draw out 
several essential points from these analyses. In recent years, China has become a normal 
status quo power whose foreign relations are subservient to domestic political  objectives 
(Breslin  2010,  Chung 2008). If  China is not  yet a hegemonic power in  Asia (Foot  2005, 
2006),  it  is  clear that  US dominance is  not  as  assured or  unchallenged as  it  once was 
(Beeson 2009, Pempel 2010a, 2010b).  Prior to the international economic crisis, China was 
already a global power with global ambitions, if only by dint of the search for raw materials, 
energy sources and markets in Africa and Latin America. But the crisis has seen a rapid 
acceleration of this trend, with China becoming the lender of last resort in Europe and in the 
United States, while, at the same time, bank-rolling infrastructure development amongst its 
southern neighbours. Yet China’s regional initiatives are secondary to its global role (Kavalski 
2009), which perhaps is being reluctantly forced upon it (Wan 2010). From this perspective, 
within the Beijing policy community the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) - as both 
a Chinese initiative and one in which Beijing controls the agenda (and the secretariat) - is  
probably of greater importance than other organisations in which it is merely a participant 
(Yuan 2010). Most importantly the SCO deals with issues crucial for China domestically (e.g. 
separatist movements in its borderlands) as well as its global power (e.g. access to energy 
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sources  to  fuel  its  export-oriented  economy).  In  Southeast  Asia  only  in  the  case  of 
Burma/Myanmar is there a direct internal security concern, namely a concern with an influx 
of  refugees  into  Yunnan  in  the  event  of  a  Burmese  implosion.  However  China,  with  its 
massive investment in that country and its provision of support to the military junta, deals 
with this potential problem in a bilateral, not regional context.
Since the first  summit  of  2005,  while  the  Chinese may still  remain  cautious  concerning 
regional  institutionalisation (Chung 2009), their  view of  multilateralism has evolved to the 
extent that some observers in China are no longer preoccupied with trying to exclude the 
United States from the region. Indeed, if China is a global actor then many analysts in China 
recognize  that  an  international  order  requires  multilateral  norms  and  must  be  inclusive 
(Zhang 2010, Zhao 2011). Outside China there is an increasingly wide spectrum of views 
about Chinese foreign policy generally (Shambaugh 2011, Sutter 2010), and about Chinese 
regional policy in particular, which is much more nuanced than the dichotomy between the so 
called  "panda  huggers"  and  the "dragon  bashers".  In  the  five  years  following  the Kuala 
Lumpur  summit  the  Chinese  policy-making  community  undertook  a  re-evaluation  of  its 
policies in relation to Southeast Asia to discover that the concept of "peaceful rise" was not 
always welcomed without reservations (Sun 2010, Zhang & Tok 2008). Allen Carlson (2011) 
has highlighted the re-emergence of the concept of  tianxia (all under heaven) in Chinese 
foreign relations discourse as a reflection at the multilateral level of the ideal of a harmonious 
society, applied in the Chinese domestic context. This is not to suggest that the objective of a 
Sino-centric regional order (Breslin 2010) or a new form of tributary system (Kang 2007) has 
fallen into abeyance. Rather, these objectives have been subsumed into a global project, or 
maybe more, involving a more committed approach to multilateralism within the international 
environment.  The  consequence  is  a  reformulation  of  Chinese  foreign  policy  in  terms  of 
multiple levels of multilateralism in which the pan-Asian, Asia-Pacific, Eurasian are placed in 
an evolving hierarchy. 
As the “playing of the India card” (Richardson 2002) to balance China in the East Asian 
Summit had proven to be ineffectual in the first five years of the EAS, there was no reason 
for Chinese policy makers to be apprehensive about an enlargement to include the United 
States. Even if there was a risk, by bringing in Russia at the same time, China could play the 
same hedging game vis à vis the US.  Moreover given the predominantly realist views that 
pervade  Chinese  foreign  relations,  by  extending  membership  at  the  expense  of  a 
strengthened agenda, the East Asia Summit could be reduced to even lesser significance.  In 
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other  words,  given  the  EAS's  largely  decorative  function,  as  with  ASEM,  issues  of 
membership would seem to be of minor consequence. Finally, acceptance of enlargement 
would reassure the countries of the Asia-Pacific of China’s inclusive peaceful intentions, at 
minimal political cost.
US Re-Engagement
Chinese reassurance for its neighbours about the continuity of the Middle Kingdom's benign 
intentions was certainly required. As evidenced by the Defence White Papers published in 
2009 and 2010, respectively in Australia and Japan, the United States’ major allies in the 
Western Pacific, there has been increasing apprehension in the Asia-Pacific region about 
significantly  increased  Chinese  military  expenditure,  China’s  acquisition  of  increasingly 
sophisticated weaponry (such as missiles and stealth aircraft), and the enlargement of its 
blue water navy (including the planned construction of an aircraft carrier). In reaction to an 
incident between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the South China 
Sea, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, had announced that the US had vital interests in free 
navigation  in  these  waters.  Subsequently  the  US Seventh  Fleet  was invited  back  to  its 
Vietnam War-era naval base of Danang and a joint training exercise with the Vietnamese 
Navy was undertaken. It  could be argued that  a more assertive Chinese leadership had 
sacrificed  a  decade  of  diplomacy  in  Southeast  Asia  attempting  to  reassure  its  southern 
neighbours that its “peaceful rise” would be beneficial to all. Certainly political leaderships in 
the  most  traditionally  pro-Chinese  Southeast  Asian  countries,  such  as  Singapore  and 
Malaysia were willing to concur with the wariness of Chinese intentions found amongst their 
counterparts in, say, Vietnam or Indonesia. 
This rapprochement with the United States is taking place within the context of potential 
divisions  within  ASEAN.  Former  Prime  Minister  Thaksin  Shinawatra4 had  previously 
proposed  his  own  regional  concept,  that  of  BIMSTEC,  involving  Bangladesh,  India, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand, which would see two ASEAN members joined with three 
South Asian countries (Chachavalpongpun 2010). This project seemed to have been largely 
forgotten after Thaksin's ousting in a military coup in September 2006, although it may return 
with the overwhelming victory of his relabelled Thai Rak Thai party and the nomination of his 
youngest sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, as Prime Minister in July 2011. In Southeast Asia forms 
4      At the beginning of the 21st century it would appear any ambitious Asian political leader needed to 
propose his regional vision.
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of  de facto economic regionalization could potentially  have the effect  of dividing ASEAN 
between  its  mainland  members  and  its  island  members.  Propelled  by  the  Chinese 
government, and with the support of the (Japanese-led and partly Western financed) Asian 
Development Bank, the Greater Mekong Sub Region has become the most dynamic part of 
Southeast Asia. Nominally its membership includes Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar as well 
as  the  two  southern  Chinese  provinces  of  Yunnan  and  Guangxi.  The  ADB  alone  has 
contributed a third of the approximately US$11 billion of infrastructure investment since 2000, 
the lion's share of the remainder coming from China. In Myanmar alone in 2010, the Chinese 
invested some $8 billion in oil, gas and hydropower and had agreed to US $80 billion in 
investment projects in Cambodia. These forms of economic integration on the ground will 
see  mainland  Southeast  Asia,  along  with  Yunnan  and  Guangxi  served  by  a  Chinese-
sponsored, integrated network of high speed rail networks, pipelines and highways by 2020 
(Wade 2011). Following the China-ASEAN FTA that came into force on 1st January 2010 - 
which in reality involves various separate FTAs with individual ASEAN members - it is not 
unreasonable  to  see  these  developments,  clearly  related  to  the rise  of  China,  as  being 
harbingers of future divisions within ASEAN. Yet can a divided ASEAN, especially one in 
which its largest member, Indonesia, by dint of its membership of the G20, is now a global  
player in its own right remain central and in the "driver’s seat” of Asian regional integration? 
Be that as it my, while the incidents discussed above provided a more enthusiastic renewed 
welcome for an American presence in Southeast Asia, the United States’ reengagement with 
Asia can be traced to the election of the Honolulu–born Barack Obama as the first self-
proclaimed Pacific president of the US. In relation to thinking in Washington and the Beltway 
on  the  East  Asian  Summit  (Cook  2008)  one  useful  indicator  is  a  comparison  of  two 
documents from the Congressional Research Service, one dating from the time of the EAS’s 
inception (Vaughn 2005) and the second five years later (Nanto 2010). In the former the EAS 
was considered mildly inimical to US interests. While it was realized that expressing strong 
US opposition would be counterproductive, it was hoped that the EAS “would simply ‘die on 
the vine’ leaving APEC as the premier venue for regional cooperation” (Searight 2011: 58). 
This  did not  happen and in  the latter  document  the EAS is  presented as a body to  be 
potentially  embraced.  In  taking  office  as  Secretary  of  State,  Hillary  Clinton,  began  a 
campaign  to  demilitarize  American  foreign  relations  and  to  put  greater  emphasis  on 
diplomatic means. The first  Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review published in 
late 2010 proclaimed a first priority in adapting to the new international environment was 
“building  our  capacity  to  organize  ourselves  regionally  and  work  through  regional 
organizations” (US Department of State 2010: 52). As for the Chinese and Japanese political 
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leaderships, this new approach on the part of the US is not seen as necessarily undermining 
either unilateralism (Cumings 2008) or hub and spokes bilateralism between an American 
“hub” and Asian “spokes” (Hemmer & Katzenstein 2002), but rather as a potentially useful 
adjunct. It is also a reactive approach prompted by concerns with China’s increasing global 
activism (Saunders 2006) and the interdependence between the United States and China 
strengthened by the global economic crisis. Contrary to much popular opinion,  the rise of 
China’s military power in Asia and its increasing assertiveness is seeing a related increase in 
American influence, one to which the political and economic elites of the smaller Asian and 
Australasian countries - ever keen to balance and hedge against China - are quite receptive 
(Sutter 2010).
Japanese Perseverance
The United States and China would appear to have converged around a position advocated 
for some time by the Japanese. The Japanese provided much of the intellectual input prior to 
the first  summit  (Council  on East  Asian Community  2001,  Japan Forum on International 
Relations 2003, Kohara 2005) as they had previously on the ASEAN +3 concept (Terada 
2003).  Yet,  prior  to  the  appointment  of  Kan Naoto  as  Prime Minister  in  June 2010,  the 
internal disagreement about building an Asia-Pacific regional body (one usually associated 
with  the Japanese Foreign Ministry)  and that  of  an exclusively  East  Asian body (usually 
associated with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) remain unresolved. Former 
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2002), like his successor Hatoyama Yukio, had been more 
favourably  disposed  toward  the  ASEAN  +3  project  of  regional  cooperation,  while  still 
continuing to pay lip service to APEC. Nevertheless, the Japanese were also the strongest 
advocates  of  Indian  (and  Australian  and  New  Zealand)  membership  of  the  East  Asian 
Summit as a balancing measure in relation to China (Terada 2010). Yet two factors militated 
for  the  extension  of  the  Summit  to  include  the  United  States,  albeit  at  the  price  of 
membership of a Russia with whom the Japanese have a long-standing territorial dispute. 
On the one hand, in pursuing the logic of balancing a China whose economic (and military) 
potency  seem  even  more  threatening  in  2010  than  in  2005,  a  US  presence  seemed 
increasingly desirable (Sohn 2010, Sudo 2010). On the other, the global economic crisis saw 
a  revival  of  the  concept  of  “open  regionalism”  central  to  APEC  (Oga  2009).  Like  their 
counterparts in China and the United States, the Japanese political and economic elites saw 
their regional actorness as subsidiary to Japan’s global role (Fukushima 2009). From this 
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perspective an enlarged East Asian Summit would be a useful, if minor, adjunct to a G20 in 
which Asian countries have at last found a place commensurate with their economic weight. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, the APEC Phoenix?
While at a superficial level,  the EAS may indicate a new impetus to a dominant form of 
regional integration, other indications are that this was not the case. In particular, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership project discussed below can be seen as not only competing with, but also 
undermining,  such  a  movement.  However,  in  order  to  explain  the  present  regional 
architecture it is necessary to go back a decade or so.  The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-
1998 was expected to provide a boost to Asian regional integration and, indeed the signing 
of regional free trade agreements is seen, misleadingly, as being an expression of regional 
integration. Moreover, the Chiang Mai Initiative, which permits swaps between Asian central 
banks initially of $80 billion and now $120 billion is often hailed as evidence of this. This 
expression of “monetary regionalism” (Dieter & Higgott 2003) is a rather weak foundation to 
argue for a reinvigorated Asian regionalism, however, since only 10% of the funds can be 
disbursed without the agreement of the World Bank and IMF. Moreover more substantive 
institutional creations such as an Asian Bond Market, an Asian Monetary Fund or even a 
common currency remain largely works in progress. Moreover, to be counter-factual, it would 
have been expected that when another crisis occurred, namely the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008-2009, then there would be renewed displays of Asian solidarity. In practice, very little of 
this  occurred  (Camroux 2010),  rather  responses  have  been  rather  more  dispersed  and 
driven at the national level (Emmers & Ravenhill 2011). On one level, given that Asia was 
little impacted on by the crisis, an intra-regional response was, perhaps, superfluous despite 
expectations to the contrary. However, it is surprising that no major political leader jumped on 
the occasion of further evidence of the decline of the West to promote a pan-Asian agenda. 
Some public intellectuals such as Kishore Mahbubani (2008), however, took this position, yet 
with the purpose of arguing for trans-Pacific cooperation on a more equal footing.  
The decade or so following the Asian Financial Crisis has seen a two-fold tendency. First 
there was a questioning of the reliance on exports and a concomitant concern to strengthen 
domestic economies. For political elites, both internal factors, namely the need to strengthen 
their political legitimacy, and external ones, the shrinking markets in the US and Europe due 
to the crisis, are engendering this focus on national markets. Secondly, there has been a 
proliferation of Free Trade Agreements in Asia and the Asia-Pacific. According to the Asian 
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Development Bank, the number of FTAs had increased from just three in 2000 to sixty-one at 
the end of 2010. Furthermore, again according to the ADB, another 79 were either being 
negotiated  or  proposed  (Kawai  &  Wignaraja  2010:  4).  Yet  these  FTAs  hardly  provide 
evidence of multilateralism, let alone, regionalism within Asia, for 77% of them are bilateral 
arrangements.
The ADB report  cited above sees four factors underlying the spread of  FTAs in the last 
decade: deepening market driven-integration; a response to economic integration in the EU 
and North America; a reaction to the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis; and disenchantment 
with the slow progress in the WTO Doha negotiations (Kawai & Wignaraja 2010). Political 
economists would add a further two factors, namely a catch-up effect, owing to a fear of 
being left out if  neighbouring countries are signing FTAs (Dent 2010) and, in the case of 
FTAs signed with the US, an expression of the instrumentalisation of trade as part of a global 
securitisation strategy (Ravenhill 2009). Most of the debate on FTAs centres on the question 
whether  they  contribute ultimately  to  global  free trade.  Certain  bodies  such as the ADB 
(Kawai & Wignaraja 2008) and some trade economists see them as building blocks (Badwin 
2006) or a matrix (Petri 2008) for a pan-Asian, or Asia-Pacific FTA, and thus as part of a 
global  movement  to  free  trade.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  those  who,  like  Jagdish 
Bhagwati (2008), see the development of the “spaghetti bowl” as undermining the movement 
towards free trade at both the regional and global level (Dent 2006, 2010). The concern here 
is not to enter into that debate but rather to suggest that the proliferation of FTAs reveals a 
good deal about regionalism, or rather, multilateralism in Asia as an analysis of the Trans-
Pacific  Partnership (TPP),  the most  recent  attempt to negotiate an Asia-Pacific  FTA, will 
show.
APEC’s obituary may have been written rather prematurely.  Following the initial  entry  of 
Australia and New Zealand, the enlargement of the East Asian Summit to include the United 
States and Russia can be interpreted as a revival of Asia-Pacific regionalism of the type 
envisaged in APEC. Whether this will be the case for another development in Asia-Pacific 
regional  integration remains to be seen. In  proposing membership of the TPP the newly 
appointed Japanese Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, appeared to be the first Japanese political 
leader prepared to confront powerful farmers and agricultural organizations in Japan. Such 
an  outcome is  symptomatic  of  the  impact  of  the  present  global  crises  on the domestic 
political economies in Asia and ensuing conceptualizations of an Asian region. Adding to this 
development,  many of the earlier influential  non-state proponents of APEC such as Fred 
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Bergsten have now become supporters of the TPP (Bergsten 2009, 2010). They have been 
joined by members of the business community, especially in the service sector particularly in 
the US (Atkinson 2011). Thus, as indicated previously, an exclusive, ‘specifically Asian’ form 
of regional integration has been weakened by the signing of bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
between  certain  Asian  countries,  such  as  Singapore  and  South  Korea,  and  non-Asian 
partners such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand. 
The on-going global financial crisis appears to have provided a boost to the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic  Economic Partnership  (usually  called the Trans-Pacific  Partnership,  or  TPP,  for 
short) negotiations (Hirata 2010).  The TPP has its origins in the P4 agreement that came 
into force in 2006 between four of the smallest countries in the Asia-Pacific: Brunei, Chile, 
New  Zealand  and  Singapore  (Gao  2010).  In  the  last  days  of  the  George  W.  Bush 
Administration in September 2008, the United States announced that it would join the talks 
when the P4 partners began working in outstanding chapters in the agreement concerned 
with Financial Services and Investment. However, actual participation in talks waited till the 
Obama Administration determined its trade policy, with the President himself announcing in 
Tokyo  on  14th November  2009  that  the  US  would  join  the  talks.  In  the  first  round  of 
negotiations in Melbourne, Australia in March 2010 the new US Trade Representative, Ron 
Kirk, was joined by his counterparts from Australia, Peru and Vietnam. They were later joined 
by  Malaysia,  a  player  of  considerable  symbolic  significance,  for  previous  Malaysian 
governments had been defenders of a purely East Asian regional construct. For proponents 
of  the  TPP  (Bergsten  2009,  Barfield  2011)  including  the  Asian  Development  Bank 
(Hamanaka 2010) it is, potentially, the single most important US trade initiative in Asia since 
the still to be ratified US-Korea FTA of 2007. The TPP is, in a sense, the latest avatar of an 
Asia-Pacific FTA first mooted almost a quarter century ago at the time of the creation of 
APEC, and its existence likewise needs to be situated in the global context. Just as APEC 
was seen as an antidote to the problems in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that 
ultimately led to the establishment of the WTO (as well as dealing with a “fortress Europe”), 
so  the  agitation  around  the  TPP is  linked  to  rather  pessimistic  assessments  about  the 
prospects for successfully concluding the Doha Round under the auspices of the WTO (as 
well  as  a  reaction  to  a  Europe  ostensibly  in  decline).  In  other  words,  opting  for 
“microlateralism“, (i.e. in this case regionally bordered multilateralism) has become a default 
option due to the ostensible limits of bilateralism and the impossibility of achieving global 
multilateralism. Anne Capling & John Ravenhill see several distinctive features of the TPP: it  
is trans-regional (Asia-Pacific); designed as a political signal symbolizing the ‘return’ of the 
US  in  Asia;  and  attempts  to  deal  with  domestic  regulatory  policies.  Fourthly,  and  most 
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significantly from the perspective of this paper, it  seeks to ‘multilateralise regionalism’ by 
rationalizing existing FTAs, being open to future members and, above all, aiming to achieve 
the APEC goal of free trade amongst its members (Capling & Ravenhill, forthcoming).
Initially, there were meant to be five rounds of negotiations (Elms 2010), but at least another 
four were added with a ninth round to be held in Lima, Peru in late October 2011. Despite its 
initial intentions, the Japanese government postponed making a decision scheduled for June 
2011 on whether to participate in the talks, due to internal divisions. While this postponement 
was justified as caused by Japanese preoccupation with the aftermath of the 11th March 
earthquake and tsunami, it does seem to have hindered study of a trilateral China-Japan-
South Korea FTA (Akita 2011)5. Once again Japanese political actors find themselves torn 
between their country’s bilateral relationship with the US - and a related Asia-Pacific focus - 
and the continuing salience of a pan-Asian region. The change from the long rule of the 
Liberal  Democratic  Party to  that  of  the Democratic  Party  has  not  resolved this  dilemma 
(Sneider 2011).
Within the United States, disagreements of a different order exist: between labour unions and 
employers, between manufacturers and those in the service industries, amongst producers 
of agricultural products, etc. (Elms 2009, 2010). Furthermore, the poisonous political climate 
in the US Congress in the lead-up to the 2012 presidential elections does not augur well for 
the  ratification  of  any  FTA,  let  alone  one  that  is  not  bilateral  (Gannon  2011).As  James 
Gannon  suggests,  “elite  attitudes  towards  an  East  Asia  community  are  linked  to  the 
dynamics of the trilateral China-Japan-US relationship” (Gannon 2011: 20). As for the first in 
this ménage à trois, the PRC has neither been invited, nor has it (yet?) sought to participate 
in the TPP. Indeed from Beijing’s perspective, the TPP can be seen, at best, as creating a 
fait accompli in the trade regime to which the Chinese will have to acquiesce or, at worst, as 
part  of  the strategy discussed above (one that is often given the epithet “congagement”) 
designed to hedge against a more globally assertive China.
Expectations have been lowered (Elms 2011), with a meeting of the 21 APEC trade ministers 
in Montana in May 2011 agreeing merely on a joint statement to push for “the broad outlines 
of an agreement by November” of that year (Reuters 2011). It thus remains, at this point 
debatable whether the APEC Leaders’ Summit planned in Hawaii in November 2011 could 
5       It is outside the boundaries of this article, but the question of the lack of regional bodies in 
Northeast Asia, emphasizes once again that multilateralism is, by default, the normal modus operandi 
in the region as a whole. (See Aggarwal, Koo & Lee 2008)
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potentially be the most significant since the Bogor Summit of 1994. In particular, resolving 
what T.J. Pempel (2010b) calls the economic-security nexus in US approaches to regional 
integration  remains  a  work  in  progress.   Nevertheless,  the  APEC  2011  Summit  will 
demonstrate both the level of US recommitment in Asia under the Obama Administration 
and, also, a possible return to the Asia-Pacific conceptualization of region very much to the 
fore in the mid-1990s (Higgott & Stubbs 1995).
Conclusion
At the end of the first decade of the new millennium, conceptions of region in Asia thus still  
remain in a state of both competition and complementarity. Ultimately, finding a conception of 
an Asian region that reconciles economic imperatives with underlying geopolitical concerns 
(Murray 2010) while still being able to generate a sense of adhesion/identification (He 2004) 
continues to be an elusive task.  However, perhaps it  does not  preoccupy many political 
leaders in Asia and the Pacific. As one Thai scholar/activist has aptly phrased the question 
“Who wants an East Asian Community (and who doesn’t)?” (Phongpaichit 2006) Perhaps 
Asian regional integration is a little like Saint Augustine's chastity: something to be prayed 
for... but not to have quite yet.  The present global financial crisis has accelerated a number 
of  developments  already  en  train (Wolf  2011),  the  most  important  being  the  virtual 
emergence  of  a  “G2”  of  China  and  the  United  States,  although  both  parties  would 
vehemently deny its existence. The result has been, at least potentially, a new lease of life to 
the  Asia-Pacific  multilateral  project  that  had  previously  been  seen  as  being  potentially 
superseded by specifically East Asian entities. However, it  would be premature to predict 
whether this will mean a revival of APEC or the creation or strengthening of another structure 
(such as the East Asia Summit).
The implication of the preceding argument is that “region”, “regionalism” and the concomitant 
notions  of  “community”,  with  a  lower  case  or  capital  “c”,  are  discursive  subterfuges  for 
promoting  multilateral  relations  within  a  porous  Asia.  The  dilemma of  “widening”  versus 
“deepening”,  which presents an on-going  fundamental  challenge in  European integration 
would appear to be much less a problem in Asia. Why is this indeed the case? In part the 
answer lies in the particularly Asian notion of concentric circles of “regions” with ASEAN at 
the centre. However, as suggested above, regional integration is not an objective  per se. 
Rather, the overriding quest of the major actors is for new mechanisms of pan-Asian (and 
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Asia-Pacific) multilateralism and cooperation (Webber 2010). The East Asian Summit and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership are merely two of a number of these. 
If “regionalism” can be a misleading heuristic device for examining international relations in 
Asia, does it have another utility? This question is pertinent because, as described above, 
actors function multilaterally at the Asian regional level in order to promote various interests 
and achieve certain tangible goals. In Arnold Wolfers’s (1962) seminal distinction these can 
be  described  as  “possession goals”  (e.g.  gaining  market  access,  defending  sovereignty, 
constraining China).  Nevertheless,  as Amy Searight  has suggested concerning American 
interest in a pan-Asia Pacific FTA, this “is not really about delivering a final deal; it is rather  
about  shaping  process  and  perceptions”  (Searight  2011:  59).  Using  again  Wolfers’s 
terminology, the promotion of a discursive regionalism can thus best be seen as pursuing a 
“milieu goal”, i.e. one designed to frame the norms of multilateral behaviour at the regional 
level. In the end the ‘pavement’ is the pursued object in itself.
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